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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BENJAMIN N. RYAN, 
Third-Party Plaintiff -
Respondent, 
-vs-
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Third-Party Defendant -
Appellant. 
CASE NO. 14293 
APPELLANTfS BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a judicial declaration determin-
ing whether the driver, Benjamin N. Ryan, was an insured under 
a liability insurance policy issued by Third-Party Defendant, 
Allstate Insurance Company to Earl Ryan. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, granted 
Summary Judgment declaring Benjamin N. Ryan an insured under 
said insurance policy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Third-Party Defendant, Allstate, seeks a reversal of 
the Summary Judgment and for a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Earl Frank Ryan is the named insured under a liability 
policy issued by Allstate. Christopher Ryan is Earlfs son. Ben-
jamin Ryan is not related. He was the driver of the insured Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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It is impossible to refer the Court to the record for 
facts as there were no depositions taken, or interrogatories 
answered, by the named insured Earl Ryan, or his son, Christ-
opher. Further, there were no court proceedings in which sworn 
testimony was taken. 
It seems clear that the Honorable Lower Court accepted 
the Statement of Facts in the Memorandum of Benjamin N. Ryan in 
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, as being uncontra-
dicted, which is not true. Earl Ryan, the named insured, in 
his Affidavit denied that he gave permission to Christoper to 
drive the car "for the stated purpose of going out with some 
friends"; or that he "was aware that the boys were out for re-
creational purposes". 
The "sworn statement" of Christopher Ryan (Exhibit A 
attached to the Memorandum) was not taken in any judicial pro-
ceeding. In fact, the record is completely devoid of who took 
the statement, who gave the oath, or whether Christopher was 
given any opportunity to elaborate, retract, or explain the 
"testimony" recited in the Memorandum. 
Appellant, therefore, submits that if it is afforded its 
right to a trial of this cause, the following facts will be 
developed through the testimony of the witnesses. 
On the evening in question, December 22, 1972, Christ-
opher Ryan, age 16, secured permission from his father Earl, to 
take the car for the purpose of driving his friend, Bruce Nez, 
home. (Earl Ryanfs Affidavit). Earl specifically instructed 
his son not to allow anyone else to drive the car. Earl had 
no knowledge whatsoever that Benjamin Ryan, whom Earl had pre-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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w i t h C h r i s t o p h e r on t h a t e v e n i n g . 
Dur ing t -a even:! n g , ; n i< I 1 » v» a : I: lar ice meet ! iig J I a s t o r e , 
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c h a s e d .in*, consumed a s w e l l a s some a lcoho 1 , They drove around 
ys dur I ng i Mic lien asked C h r i s t o p h e r 
• t i. . ~« • - and C h r i s t o p h e r r e f u s e d u muic ih< 
c a s i o n . Benjamin k e p t i n s i s t i n g and • < * 7e 
t:rom one l ov I Lng al ley 1 at,, a p p r o x i m a t e . * •- i'* a St .-o. -
a bowl ing a l l e y a t 226.') Sou th S t a t e , . lu :*t r 'ley a g r e e u t u ^ w ^ i d 
a g a i n s t o p , C h r i s t o p h e r a g r e e d . 
i I in1 I ii '.' . lop 1 iplil a car d rove up along s i d e , 
c h a l l e n g e d Benjamin to a d r a g r a c e , which ho r e a d i l y a c c e p t e d , 
Benjamin p u l l e d alio\id of I In1 n the i i ui u h i i h nrupped back a lmos t 
i m m e d i a t e l y , and I hi " d r a g r a c e " was o v e r . However, Benjamin 
c o n t i n u e d d r i v i n g f a s t on f ho fo" r o a d s , a b o u t f i f t y no l a , |<cr 
no * ophei r e p e a t e d l y a s K ' M i 11 i in in slow down a^ d id Lbc 
n t - ' . j r Lv'o boys In t h e c a r . He i g n o r e d t h e i r r e q u e s t s , and in 
i's* \ , speeded up . As Benjamin was a p p r o a c h i n g I he d e f i n e ! nm >il 
i. i i Ii v i sLopher s h o u t e d t o Benjamin t o s t o p , a s 
t h e y were n e a r t h e d e s t i n a t i o n . Benj imin Ignored t h e n r d e r , w i t h -
it evoi. s lowing * he e e h i Y l o invo lved iin lino JCC i iliiinl minIJoni ou t 
hal a d c h e s s and \^iis s t r u c k by t h e Ryan v e h i c l e 
which was s t i l l t r a v e l i n g a t f i f t y m i l e s p e r h o u r , or men , 
The a c c i d e n t o i e u r i u - I , ( lie iv l / u t , f he d r i v e -
way in which Benjamin Ryan, had lie compl i ed w i t h t.he p e r m i s s i o n 
g r a n t e d , would have been d r i v i n g e n t e r i n g ? no ; " ei ea
 v had 
he nor <• . led Hi ies. pormi s.s i on . 
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POINT ONE 
THE LOWER COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT ANY 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF RULE 56, U.R.C.P. 
In Transamerica Title Insurance Company -vs- United 
Resources, Inc., 24 Ut.2d at 348, 471 P.2d 165, this Court 
stated: 
"Summary Judgments are governed by our Rule 56, 
U.R.C.P,, which states in part (c): 
...The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. (Emphasis added by the Court).'1 
"It is thus clear from this rule that when upon 
the basis of the pleadings, depositions, answers..., 
admissions and affidavits, which we herein refer to 
as "submissions", a party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment 
should be granted. But if it appears from such 
"submissions" that there is a dispute as to any 
issue of fact which would be determinative of the 
rights of the parties, it should be denied and a 
trial should be had to resolve the disputed issues." 
In National American Life Ins. Co. -vs- Bayou Country 
Club, 16 Ut.2d at 421, 403 P.2d 26, this Court stated: 
"Justification for the granting of summary judgment 
will depend largely upon whether or not the record will 
support the District Courtfs findings..." 
In Tangren -vs- Ingalls, 12 Ut.2d at 395, 367 P.2d 179: 
"The sustaining of summary motions without afford-
ing the party an opportunity to present his evidence 
is a stringent measure which courts should be reluctant 
to grant. It should be borne in mind that although dis 
posing of a case on such a motion may seem an easy and 
expeditious method of dealing with litigation, it may 
not in fact be so. Unless the court feels a high de-
gree of assurance that such ruling is correct it may 
result in defeating that purpose and actually pro-
tracting the litigation by requiring an appeal and then 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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having a trial which should have been had in the 
first place. Accordingly, the privilege of pre-
senting evidence should be denied only when, 
taking the view most favorable to the party s 
claims, he could not in any event establish a 
right to redress under the law; and unless it 
clearly so appears, doubts should be resolved in 
favor of permitting him to go to trial." 
In Dupler -vs- Yates, 10 Ut.2d at 269, 351 P.2d 624, 
wherein the Court quoted testimony from depositions at great 
length, stated: 
"Rule 56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to provide 
a substitute for a regular trial of cases in which 
there are disputed issues of fact upon which the 
outcome of the litigation depends. And it should be 
invoked with caution to the end that litigants may 
be afforded a trial where there exists between them 
a bona fide dispute of material fact.11 
See also Continental Bank & Trust Co. -vs- Cunningham, 
10 Ut.2d 329, 353 P.2d 168. 
Brandt -vs- Springville Banking Co., 10 Ut.2d at 354, 
353 P.2d 460, wherein this Court stated: 
frWe are cognizant of the desirability of per-
mitting litigants to fully present their case to 
the court and that a summary judgment prevents this. 
For that reason, courts are, and should be, reluctant 
to invoke this remedy." 
In accord see Housley -vs- Anaconda Company, 19 Ut.2d 
124, 427 P2d 390: 
"Prior decisions point out that summary judgment 
is a drastic remedy and should be granted with re-
luctance. The Plaintiffs should be granted the op-
portunity of producing whatever evidence they wish, 
including circumstantial evidence, in support of their 
contention that the defendant Cox was acting within 
the scope of his employment." 
We again point out that the Honorable Lower Court granted 
a Summary Judgment without any depositions, or interrogatories 
answered by the insured or his son. There were no admissions or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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other discovery, excepting that interrogatories were answered 
by Benjamin Ryan, the answers to which Allstate is not bound. 
POINT TWO 
THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS OF FACT THAT CAN ONLY BE AN-
SWERED BY THE TRIER OF FACT IN A TRIAL OF THIS CASE. 
The following questions of fact have not been answered in 
the record as it now stands. We also submit some of the author-
ities having to do with these questions. 
1. WHAT, IN FACT, WAS THE "USE" OF THE VEHICLE GRANTED 
TO CHRISTOPHER BY HIS FATHER, EARL? 
Appellant maintains that the use was limited to driving 
a friend home. The Honorable District Judge apparently assumed, 
based on the statements of counsel for Third-Party Plaintiff, 
that the use was general and unrestricted. Even Appellee agrees, 
however, that Christopher was prohibited from allowing any other 
person to drive. 
7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobile Insurance, Sec. 119, Pg. 438 
et. seq. outlines the holdings in the various juris-
dictions as the law is applied to specific factual 
findings. The law can hardly be applied to facts that 
are competely in dispute. 
2. DID BENJAMIN RYAN HAVE IMPLIED PERMISSION TO DRIVE THE 
CAR, FROM EARL RYAN? AS A COROLLARY, HD HE HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
THAT HE WAS PROHIBITED BY EARL FROM DRIVING THE CAR? 
In his Answers to Interrogatories, Benjamin Ryan, in 
answer to Interrogatory #6, states that he had previously had 
"indirect" permission to drive the car. Earl Ryan denies this 
in his Affidavit, and states he had previously forbidden Benjamin 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Certainly, if it be determined that Benjamin had 
knowledge that he was prohibited from driving the car, he 
would be estopped from now claiming coverage under the in-
surance policy that required that "the actual use is with 
the permission of the named insured". 
As to implied use, the law is clear that there must be 
shown a "course of conduct" from which the permission is 
implied. 
4 ALR 3rd Sec. 12 (b) @ Pg. 72. 
What Benjamin means by "indirect!'permission has not 
been explained. His deposition has not been taken as he was 
in the Armed Service outside the state. 
3. AFTER GIVING BENJAMIN PERMISSION TO DRIVE FROM 
POINT A TO POINT B, DID CHRISTOPHER, BY HIS DEMANDS AND 
ACTIONS, ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE HIS DOMINION AND CONTROL OVER 
THE DRIVER DURING THE TRIP, AND BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, BY ORDER-
ING HIM TO SLOW AND STOP, BEFORE POINT B WAS REACHED? 
Stated another way: 
DID BENJAMIN EXCEED OR MATERIALLY DEVIATE FROM THE 
PERMISSION GRANTED HIM, BY DRIVING IN A WILFUL AND WANTON 
MANNER, AND BY IGNORING THE DEMANDS OF CHRISTOPHER AND THE 
OTHER PASSENGERS TO SLOW AND STOP, AND BY SPEEDING BEYOND 
THE POINT HE HAD PERMISSION TO DRIVE? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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For an excellent Annotation on the broad field of 
law relating to the "omnibus" clause, see 4 ALR 3rd 10. 
See also, the following Utah cases: 
Muggleston -vs- Gluittli 123 Ut. 238, 258 P.2d 438. 
Western Casualty -vs- Transamerica 26 Ut.2d 50, 484 
P.2d 1180. 
State Farm -vs- Strang 27 Ut.2d 362, 496 P.2d 707. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. M1DGLEY 
Attorney for Third-Party 
Defendant, Allstate Insurance 
Company 
574 East 2nd South, #206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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